Will the Arab Spring spread south?

The people’s revolution that has rocked North Africa could have a domino effect in sub-Saharan Africa, writes Jeggan Senghor

In discussing the recent momentous events in Tunisia and Egypt, the two countries have commonly been situated in the Arab rather than the African world; they are placed squarely in the Middle East and not in Africa. Similarly, in exploring the likely domino effects of these developments commentators go as far as including Qatar and Yemen while ignoring Sudan, for example, which, geographically, is much closer to the Maghreb states and very much within the African continent.

The revolution has moved from east to west to take in Libya and with pockets of dissent being reported in Algeria and Morocco. Thus, the revolution’s North African character has been recognised. For now, the ‘Arab-ness’ of these countries is what is of paramount consideration and, as such, they are understandably lumped together with other ‘Arab’ states.

The reality is that the physical space occupied by Tunisia, Egypt and Libya is in Africa. This cannot be denied and the five North African countries themselves recognise this as is shown, for example, in their active participation in African organisations. Obviously, the Sahara plays an important role in creating this ‘apartness’. For the purposes of this article, therefore, we straddle the desert to examine a few of the issues arising from the peoples’ revolutions in North Africa that call for greater attention among politicians and policy makers in the rest of the African continent.

First, some characteristics of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt where the leaders have been forced out of power by the protesters. Most obvious is the issue of the long periods in which the respective heads of state had been in power – 23 years in Tunisia and 30 years in Egypt. For the other Maghreb states it is 41 years in Libya, 12 years in Algeria, and a centuries-old monarchy in Morocco. This is of much consequence to sub-Saharan Africa where at least 12 countries have regimes aged 20 years or more. True, a great many more would like to move in the direction of regimes in perpetuity but are constrained by a range of factors and forces, domestic and external. As seen in several instances, for countries without any term limits this is going to be much easier. And, of course, as in Mubarak’s Egypt, one must not forget the growing number with dynastic tendencies exemplified in Togo, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, and Senegal, excluding the kingdoms.

Then there is the issue that the longer the individual stays in power the more likely that the human and other fundamental rights of the populations would be violated. In order words, the regime turns out to be despotic, authoritarian, and dictatorial, and builds sophisticated security systems to control the populations and purposely trample their basic rights.

This leads to the issue of stability versus democratic development under a multi-term regime which has been thrown up by the events in North Africa. A debate on the subject is for another day. For now, it suffices to say that the Tunisia and Egypt are not mutually exclusive: many are the political systems that safeguard security without sacrificing democratic development.
Do the two experiences illustrate a correlation between longevity, type of political system and high socio-economic performance? Granted, in earlier decades high levels of economic growth and social development were recorded in both countries, and there is evidence of improved welfare; it was the very countries that are more liberal and genuinely attempting to build democratic systems that were the poor performers. However, in the last few years the economy has not been able to cope with high levels of unemployment, especially among university graduates and products of the large number of tertiary-level institutions in both countries; price hikes for basic commodities have impacted household budgets of large segments of the populations. These have been some of the main triggers of the demonstrations in towns and cities across North Africa.
Related to this, the region’s experiences also raise the issue of whether the type of governance systems have facilitated economic and financial crimes, corruption, illegal acquisition of wealth, social immobility, alienation, and a militarised society. Indeed, the reality is that regardless of the system African leaders (broadly defined) are deeply steeped in corrupt practices and wealth accumulation. Perhaps, the difference lies in scale – Mubarak’s wealth is estimated at tens of billions of United States dollars, which must be a record for leaders anywhere.
Second, following this summary discussion on some issues pertaining to the type of systems in place it is important to also focus on the nature of the revolution. Outstanding is the fact that it was spontaneous and that it took place in multiple venues not just the capital city. It did not have any identifiable leader(s) – which made for individual ownership of thinking and action. Because of this it was easier to focus not on any individual but only on one common demand: that the head of state must go. Having a leader, a pre-designed plan of action, manifesto and the like could have easily given rise to dissentions, debates, controversies, and possibilities of splintering which would have diverted attention from the fundamental demand. This did not mean that there was no organisation. Having provisions, food, water, blankets, and other amenities available throughout the period attest to this.
Young people, who in their whole lives have known no other persons as head of state but Ben Ali or Mubarak constituted the bulk of the pro-democrats. But these new civil society activists were also made up of people of different age-groups, religions, social status, occupations, professions, and ideological persuasions. This made for solidarity and must have motivated the core protesters to vigorously pursue the cause. Also noteworthy is the constructive use made by them of modern communications wherewithal, especially twitter and face book.

The revolutionaries were undaunted; they displayed a tenacity and commitment that is very rare. They did not disappear when the police and regime agents unleashed an avalanche of beatings, water cannon, tear gas, camels and horses, and different kinds of missiles on them but came back emboldened. Good relations seemed to have been built up with the army who appeared to understand the grievances of the demonstrators if even they did not share them.
This compares unfavourably with security forces in many other African countries which have a reputation for brutality, high-handedness and wanton muzzling and terrorisation of the people. In the end it is apparent that it was pressure from the military that led Mubarak to resign; he had become a liability to the people, the army and the country.
To what extent do these issues relate to countries across sub-Saharan Africa? How do the situations in North Africa that gave rise to such cataclysmic transformations compare with those in the sub-Saharan countries? What implications do these issues have for other African countries? What are the possibilities of these situations being exploited to advantage either by system beneficiaries or potential dissidents? What policies can governments develop to respond to the ‘matters arising’ from the Maghreb revolution? The debate is open. (Courtney Dieterich)